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SCALES project is a research project funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research programme on “Responsible Innovation”, 
with several private and public partners participating. The overarching research question of SCALES is how to strike a balance between the 
occasional conflict stakes of individuals, public and private data-producers, data controllers and data-processors.  The project aims to inform the 
regulatory and institutional landscape, allowing for optimal utilization of data analytics to serve the interests of governments, companies, and 
users, while optimally safeguarding individual rights and liberties. In achieving this objective, case studies have been conducted with the partners 
in the field of energy, law enforcement, and data analytics. This report has been produced by researchers at the eLaw Center for Law and Digital 
Technologies at Leiden University. In doing so, our understanding of practical aspects of the Dutch energy market is based on the information 
provided by Alliander as well as information available from public sources. 
1. Introduction 
In order for societies of the world to 
function or for countries to be able to power 
their economy, we need a stable energy 
supply. On the other hand, this energy 
supply has to increasingly come from 
renewable sources for our planet not to be 
depleted. [1] Following this reasoning, the 
United Nations prescribed affordable and 
clean energy as one of seventeen 
Sustainable Developments Goals. [2] This 
goal requires a focus on increasing energy 
efficiency and sharing of renewable energy 
sources in the global energy mix. Dealing 
with these two focal points requires 
encouraging energy market for 
investments, that implies expanding 
infrastructure and upgrading technology to 
supply modern energy services. [3] 
The European Union designed a 
package of eight legislative acts, the 
"Clean Energy for all Europeans package", 
focusing the same focal points as UN to 
increase benefits for energy consumers 
(energy efficiency), for the environment 
(renewable energy) and economy (market 
encouragement). [4]  
Among other things, technology in the 
form of smart meters is one of the factors 
influencing the energy market by creating 
possibilities for innovative business 
models, making it more profitable for 
businesses to provide clean and affordable 
energy. [5] Having this in mind, the EU 
legislative framework is promoting the 
introduction of such intelligent metering 
systems and setting 2020 as the target 
date to which 80% of energy consumers 
are equipped with smart meters. [6]  
By a decision of the Dutch government 
the large-scale roll-out of smart meters has 
started in January 2015 with the aim that at 
the end of 2020, smart meters should have 
been offered to all Dutch households. [7] 
This is envisaged to provide access to 
data, enable novel business models in the 
energy market in which participating 
consumer is empowered, and therefore, 
the goals of Clean Energy Package are 
achieved [8] 
Figure 1. Roll-out plans: Implementation speed and penetration rate of at least 80% of 
all consumers by 2020 (Source: European Commission [41]). 
Figure 2. Goals of the Energy Reform 
Energy Efficiency
Renewable Energy
Market Encouragement
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However, the roll-out in the 
Netherlands has pre-history as the initial 
plans for the introduction of smart meters 
sparked fierce public debate in 2008 about 
data privacy. [5] One of the core functions 
of smart meters is data collection, that is 
directed towards more efficient grid 
management. [9] However, as research 
shows this data can also reveal information 
such as: when a consumer is at home, and 
when s/he is away, when s/he cooks 
dinner, watches TV, takes a shower, when 
laundry is done, kids are alone at home or 
which TV channel is being watched. [10] 
[11] [12] [13] 
To deal with privacy issues, individual 
control over personal data has become an 
important subject in the ongoing large-
scale roll-out since 2015 in the 
Netherlands. The General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) also addresses the 
need for more individual control over 
personal data more explicitly, designing 
consent as the ultimate tool for exercising 
such control. [14] 
The Smart Grids Task Force Expert 
Group 1 (hereafter EG1) set up to advise 
the European Commission related to smart 
grid deployment predicted in 2016 that the 
amount of data on energy consumption will 
increase tremendously. However, they 
argued that a consent management 
mechanism, allowing consumers to access 
and manage their data, is crucial to fully 
reap the potential benefits for the energy 
market and consumers in general. [15] 
This report analyzes the challenges 
that the Dutch energy market faces during 
large-scale smart meter roll-out, in 
particular during implementing the 
customer consent management 
mechanism to on the one hand allow 
access to data (and enable modern energy 
services) and on the other to ensure that 
consumer is in charge of his/her data. This 
report does not address security issues 
related to smart meters (for an overview of 
security issues, please see  P. v. Aubel and 
E. Poll, 2019 [5]). 
In Chapter 1, we will elaborate on 
actors in the Dutch electricity market. In 
chapters 2 and 3, we will describe smart 
metering infrastructure in the Netherlands, 
and the data flows within such 
infrastructure. In Chapter 4 we will explain 
how do previous chapters raise an issue of 
data privacy, while in Chapter 5 we will 
elaborate what role a consent 
management mechanism has to play in 
dealing with this issue. Chapter 6 will list 
the roadblocks towards the implementation 
of such a consent management 
mechanism, and in Chapter 7, we will draw 
our conclusions. 
2. Actors in the Dutch Energy Market 
The Transmission System Operator (TSO) 
is in charge of operating the higher-voltage 
electricity grid and transmits electrical 
power from generation plants over the 
electrical grid i to the Distribution System 
Operator (DSO) that is responsible for the 
operation of the electrical grid at a regional 
level. [16] 
The DSO is typically also responsible 
for operating lower voltage grid, the 
installation of smart meters, and for 
collecting meter readings. [5] There are 
seven DSOs in the Netherlands, with the 
three largest – Liander, Enexis, and Stedin 
– serving the majority of the country’s 
population. [17] All seven Dutch DSOs 
united with TenneT – electricity TSO and 
Gasuine – gas TSO – form in a sector 
association called Netbeheer Nederland 
(Netherlands Grid Management) that 
establishes and publishes, among other 
things, codes of conduct for the processing 
of personal data involved in smart metering 
for different market parties. [18]  
The Netherlands operates with a 
supplier-centric model since 2013 – 
meaning that energy is sold to the 
consumers by the Energy Suppliers (ES), 
the commercial parties that use the 
infrastructure of the DSO to deliver 
electricity. [19] ESs are the parties that 
usually have direct contact with the 
consumer, billing them not only for their 
services but also for the network costs on 
behalf of DSOs. [15] 
This supplier-centric model can only 
operate if DSOs that have direct access to 
meter readings, provide these data to ESs, 
who then will be able to provide billing and 
insights to the consumers based on their 
consumption. (see Figure 3) The Energie 
Data Services Nederland (EDSN) was set 
up by the Dutch DSOs to smoothen 
administrative processes involved in the 
provision of metering data. It acts as the 
data hub or central access server (CAS), 
providing metering data to ESs irrespective 
of the DSO responsible for the region 
where a consumer is located. [5] [20] 
The introduction of smart meters 
triggers the formation of a new category of 
parties: the Independent Service Providers 
(ISPs) (Overige Diensten-Aanbieders in 
Dutch). [5] While DSOs and ESs are 
typically gathering data to provide their 
legally mandated services (e.g., grid 
management, billing), ISPs can use data 
from smart meters to offer additional 
services, e.g., advising how to save energy 
via a smartphone app or a web tool. [21] 
See a more detailed list of purposes for 
Figure 3. Standardized Smart Meter in the Netherlands (Source: DSMR [23], adapted from 
P. v. Aubel en E. Poll, "Smart Metering in the Netherlands: What, How and Why (draft)," vol. 
109, pp. 719-725, July 2019. [5] ) 
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processing in Table 3. Purposes of 
processing smart meter data (Information 
from the Code [18]) 
ISPs that are operating energy price 
comparison websites, for example, can 
receive similar data as ESs via EDSN, 
while ISPs operating smart thermostats 
such as Google Nest [22], can get access 
to data by connecting directly to the smart 
meter at the location (See Figure 3. 
Standardized Smart Meter in the 
Netherlands (Source: DSMR [23], adapted 
from P. v. Aubel en E. Poll, "Smart 
Metering in the Netherlands: What, How 
and Why (draft)," vol. 109, pp. 719-725, 
July 2019. [5] ) 
The next chapter provides a more 
detailed explanation of the categories of 
data that are being available by smart 
metering infrastructure. 
3. Smart Metering Infrastructure 
The last version of Dutch Smart Meter 
Requirements (DSMR) [23] published by 
Netbeheer Nederland prescribe 
specifications of smart meters. The smart 
meter itself has four communication ports 
(P0, P1, P2, P3), while the fifth 
communication port (P4) of the 
infrastructure is provided at the Central 
Access Server (at EDSN). (See Figure 3. 
Standardized Smart Meter in the 
Netherlands (Source: DSMR [23], adapted 
from P. v. Aubel en E. Poll, "Smart 
Metering in the Netherlands: What, How 
and Why (draft)," vol. 109, pp. 719-725, 
July 2019. [5] ) Here are the specifications 
of each port:  
P0 – This port is used for the local 
connection with external devices (such as 
hand-held terminals) during installation 
and maintenance work. 
P1 – This port, also known as 
consumer port, allows for the local 
communication with third-party or auxiliary 
equipment, such as smart thermostats for 
instance. This port provides near-time 
information on energy consumption (see 
Table 1. Data via P1). It is a read-only 
interface and cannot be used to send data 
to CAS.  
Table 1. Data via P1 (Source: DSMR [23])  
Readings Interval Retention 
Live 
electricity 1-10 seconds 
- 
Live gas 5 min - 
Tariff  Last available - Equip. status - 
P2 – This port connects to other local 
metering equipment, typically to enable 
connection with a smart natural gas or 
water meters. 
P3 – This port communicates data from 
the smart meter to the Central Access 
System (CAS) of EDSN via head ends / 
systems of DSO’s. Data that is being 
communicated includes meter readings 
(either the stored readings or the current 
meter readings), status checks, power 
quality and outage measurements, and 
remote updates (See Table 2. below) 
Table 2. Data provided to DSO via P3 (Source: 
(Source: DSMR [23], adapted from P.v Aubel and 
E.Poll, 2019. [5]) 
Periodicity Retention time 
Monthly 13 months 
Daily 40 days 
Hourly (gas) Ten days 
15 min (electricity) Ten days 
P4 – This port is located at the CAS and 
communicates data to ESs and ISPs (data 
communicated to CAS from P3). Note that 
in some documents, P4 is used to describe 
communication from both P3 and P4 ports, 
as the same data is communicated via both 
ports. 
Figure 4. Relation of Smart Meter Data and 
Personal Data (Source: Code [18]) 
However, this should not be 
understood as EDSN pro-actively 
collecting metering data into a central 
database. [5] Metering data (Table 2) is 
stored in a meter. When ES or ISP requires 
metering data of a customer, it requests 
data from EDSN; EDSN forwards requests 
to the responsible DSO. DSO retrieves 
requested metering data via P3 port and 
sends it to EDSN, that caches data and 
awaits for final request from ES or ISP. 
Upon such request, EDSN communicates 
metering data via P4 port to ES or ISP.  
Note that such process for the retrieval 
of meter readings might take up to 24 
hours, the difference between P4 and P1 is 
not just that P4 data is less fine-grained 
(15-min data instead of 10-sec), but also 
data is not available in real-time if it is 
communicated via P4. [5] 
4. Processing of Personal Data 
Data generated in the smart meters can 
reveal personal information about the 
consumers. [10] Having this in mind, 
Netbeheer Nederland issued the “Code of 
Conduct for the Processing of Personal 
Data by DSOs in the Context of Installation 
and Management of Smart Meters with 
Private Customers” (hereafter “Code”) that 
is legally binding for all DSOs since 2012.  
The code [18] categorizes data into 
three types of data: (1) smart meter data – 
covers all the data received by CAS, such 
as status (up/down), the settings of the 
clock and firmware. (2) meter readings (in 
Dutch: “meetgegevens” or “meterstanden”) 
refer to the data that relates to the energy 
consumption of the customer. (3) Interval 
readings are meter readings based on a 
specified time interval (e.g., 10-second, 15-
min data for electricity). (See Figure 4.) 
The code explains that while meter 
readings (and therefore interval readings) 
are personal data, not all smart meter data 
can always be considered personal data. 
For example, anonymous technical data 
such as information on time synching, 
voltage quality, or battery status fall outside 
of the scope of personal data. [18] The 
Code was approved to be in compliance 
with Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens 
(Wbp) or the Dutch Personal Data 
Protection Act by College Bescherming 
Persoonsgegevens (CBP) that was the 
name of the Dutch Data Protection 
Authority at that time. [24] Nevertheless, 
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the Code fails to draw a complete picture 
to what exactly constitutes processing of 
personal data (in particular, smart meter 
data other than meter readings), an issue 
that we will also touch upon in chapter 4. 
Following the reasoning in the Code, 
meter readings communicated from the 
smart meter to DSOs (and afterward to 
CAS) via P3 port are personal data. The 
Code also clarifies purposes for which 
DSOs can process the mentioned data 
(see Table 3.): 
A. Grid management – amended 
Electricity Act of 1998 [25], Electricity and 
Gas Information Code (hereafter 
“Information Code”) [26] and the Code [18] 
prescribe legal mandate of DSOs to 
provide grid management as their primary 
task. Such management might include 
locating and solving voltage interruptions, 
reducing grid loss, executing control 
orders, or other related tasks (see in Table 
3. - A1. Technical control of the grid). Grid 
management also refers to tasks related to 
meter management (see in Table 3. – A2), 
and includes synchronizing clock in the 
smart meter, checking battery status and 
other related tasks. Finally, grid 
management activities can involve the 
processing of data for experimentation and 
innovation (see in Table 3. – A3). 
Note that, because of the public debate 
on privacy issues regarding smart meter 
data (discussed in more detail in chapter 
4), the Code prescribes a right of the 
energy consumer to “turn off” remote 
readability of smart meters. [18] If such 
right is exercised, DSOs are not allowed to 
continue processing data for technical 
control of the grid (A1) or data for analytics 
and statistics (A3).  
However, DSOs can process smart 
metering data, including any personal data 
even when the customer has turned off 
remote readability, but the processing is 
necessary for meeting with the statutory 
obligation of managing the smart meters 
(see in Table 3. – A2).  
B. Market facilitation – The second 
core function of DSOs is market facilitation. 
This might involve several types of 
processing. First of all, in the words of 
Electricity Act of 1998 [25] and the Data 
Management Regulation and the Payment 
of Electricity and Gas [27] the role of a DSO 
in the “administrative process” is to provide 
consumption data of a customer to ES for 
billing (See Table 3. – B1). Note that, while 
it is a statutory obligation for the DSO to 
provide consumption data to ES, for the 
latter processing of such data comes from 
the necessity of a performance of a 
contract. Therefore what kind of data has 
to flow to an ES is dependent on the 
agreement between the ES and a 
customer. [18] Currently, data necessary 
for the ES to bill the customer can be an 
annual (maximum monthly [28]) meter 
readings and excludes interval readings 
(15-min data). [5] If an ES wants to acquire 
interval readings for purposes other than 
billing, they have to ground such 
processing on consumer consent. (See 
Table 3. – B) 
As mentioned earlier in chapter 1, other 
services that smart meter data can be used 
for include smart thermostats aimed to 
stimulate energy savings (See Table 3. – 
B2), or other services (e.g., price 
comparison service) (See Table 3. – B3). 
The ground for processing data mentioned 
in the previous paragraph is the consent of 
a customer. Note that, interval data can 
only be provided to ESs and ISPs if they 
have the explicit consent of a customer 
and, also, if they provide energy-saving 
services. 
It is important to note that instead of 
obtaining the 15-min interval data via P3 
(via the DSOs), an ISP can also obtain data 
via the P1 port. They then have to provide 
a consumer with a device to attach to P1 to 
send back data, e.g., via that customer's 
internet connection. Such information flow 
will circumvent the DSOs and CAS. [5]  
Finally, it is not clear to what extent 
some smart meter data outside of the 
category of meter readings might fall under 
the definition of personal data. The 
question arises if the combination of 
different data (e.g., clock sync, voltage 
quality, meter status) can ever be 
combined in a manner to reveal privacy-
sensitive information of a customer. 
5. Data Privacy and Access to Data 
The first phase of smart meter roll-out in 
the Netherland was initiated in 2007, 
having in mind the same goal of energy 
efficiency as today. [10] This initiative that 
tried to force smart meter infrastructure to 
Table 3. Purposes of processing smart meter data (Information from the Code [18]) 
Processor Controller Caterogry of data Personal / non-pesonal data Ground for processing Limitations
Non-personal data N/A
Personal Data Statutory obligation
Non-personal data N/A
Personal Data Statutory obligation
A3. Analytics and 
statistics
Smart meter data
Non-personal data (including 
anonymised personal data)
Statutory obligation Not if remotely turned-off
B1. Billing
Meter readings 
(excl. interval 
readings)
Personal data Statutory obligation
Contract between ES and a 
customer
Meter readings 
(excl. interval 
readings)
Personal data Statutory obligation Not if remotely turned-off
Interval Readings Personal data Consent Not if remotely turned-off
Non-personal data N/A
Personal data Consent
Purpose
A.
 G
rid
 M
an
ag
em
en
t
DSO
Smart meter data
A1. Technical control 
of the grid
Smart meter data
A2. Meter 
management
DSO
B.
 M
ar
ke
t F
ac
ilit
ati
on
B3. Other services Smart meter data Not if remotely turned-off
ES / ISP
ES
B2. Energy saving
Not if remotely turned-off
No limitations
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Dutch citizens did not consider consumer 
privacy beyond the Wbp which was in force 
at the time and failed to comply with the 
requirements of Article 8 of European 
Convention of Human Rights. [5] Following 
this reasoning the Senate of the 
Netherlands blocked this initiative and 
passed the laws only after several 
amendments. Detailed accounts of this 
phase of a roll-out provided by Cuijpers 
and Koops [10] reveal that by putting 
pressure on unwilling consumers to accept 
smart meters, initiators jeopardized public 
perception of the legitimacy of the roll-out. 
In order to calm the public debate 
surrounding the privacy issues of the first 
phase of roll-out, the final package passed 
by the parliament not only removed the 
obligation to accept new smart meters, but 
introduced a possibility to “administratively 
turn off” remote readability of a smart meter 
if a smart meter had already been installed. 
(See Chapter 3 in particular Table 3. – 
Limitations) These amendments also 
introduced the necessity of consumer 
consent for ESs and ISPs to process 15-
min interval data, instead of this being the 
default metering regime. [5] 
Statistics published by the central 
government in 2017, illustrated that around 
10% of consumers refused installation of 
smart meters, and 2% had turned off 
remote readability. [29]  
Under the current framework, it is not 
clear whether DSOs are able to process 
personal data beyond necessary tasks to 
maintain the functioning of the grid. (see in 
Table 3.) For instance, it is questionable if 
it is possible for the DSOs to collect 
consent to process personal data for 
improving the grid. (However, in one recent 
case, one of the DSOs, did ask for the 
consent from the consumers of energy to 
collect interval data. [30]) Note that these 
measures go beyond requirements of Wbp 
or the current AVG (Algemene 
Verordening Gegevensbescherming, the 
Dutch translation of the GDPR) to arguably 
decrease the pressure created by the 
public perception of the roll-out. 
This approach allowed the Dutch 
government to pass a new roll-out law. 
However, another pressure that the market 
experiences is the forced move towards 
data access and exchange caused by 
"Clean energy package." EG1 refers to the 
Energy Efficiency Directive to state in their 
latest report (“Towards Interoperability for 
Electricity and Gas Data Access & 
Exchange within the EU”) that consumers 
must be able to receive their meter reading 
data to allow access to it to the ESs or ISPs 
of their choice. [6] Moreover, EG1 
suggests for the states to develop a 
standardized national arrangement to 
ensure that data access and exchange 
happens via a trusted mechanism, in a 
transparent and non-discriminatory 
manner. [19] 
Currently, such a trusted mechanism is 
under development in the Netherlands 
(See [15]; [19]) and aims to provide a 
golden mean between two pressing needs 
described above – on the one hand, to 
enable the possibility of data exchange 
and, on the other, to maintain strong 
protection of privacy. Chapter 6 below, 
tries to describe such a mechanism in 
consideration and the challenges the 
market faces during its implementation.  
6. Consent Management Mechanism 
In March 2019, Netherlands Authority for 
Consumers and Markets (Autoriteit 
Consument en Markt, ACM) published a 
vision document on data governance with 
regard to energy (hereafter “ACM vision”) 
[31] Aiming to complement "Clean energy 
package", this document designates the 
necessity of developing the system of data 
management in the Netherlands. 
The ACM vision suggests that such a 
system should be reliable, affordable, and 
safe. Most importantly, this system must 
ensure consumer control over his/her data. 
The document refers to the right to data 
portability (hereafter Rt2DP) prescribed in 
the Article 20 of AVG [32] to describe 
desirable framework of the consumer 
Figure 5. Flows in Central Access System and Consent Register. 
Report on Consumer Control of Energy Data   6 
control, suggesting that every consumer 
must have her own “measurement data 
page” on the internet, on which she is able 
to grant or withdraw access to the data to 
various market parties via consent. 
In order to achieve such consumer-
control, ACM highlights the importance of 
developing a comprehensive authorization 
model, so that it is technically impossible 
for unauthorized parties to have access to 
the data [31]. 
Although discussions on such trusted 
consent management (and authorization) 
mechanism for data governance has been 
ongoing for the last few years ( [15]; [19]), 
it has escalated following the publication of 
the ACM Vision. The currently discussed 
platform-independent system aims to 
designate EDSN/DSO’s as the party 
operating centralized consent registry (CR) 
for data kept by DSOs from DSOs’ sources 
(e.g. metering data). This enables to 
register consent at the data source. 
Consent for other data sources should be 
given to the owner of- and resgistered at 
the data sourceThis CR will contain, 
among other information, a list of 
processing activities on the data of a 
consumer, history of consents, categories 
of data being processed, purposes, and 
grounds of processing. 
ESs and ISPs that are in a contractual 
relationship with a consumer will connect 
to the CR with Application Programming 
Interface (API). They will have the option to 
display the information available through 
CR to the consumer in their independent 
online consent management interface 
(CMI) (See Figure 5).  
Nevertheless, a genuinely successful 
implementation of such a system will need 
to take into consideration existent 
roadblocks discussed in the next chapter.  
7. Roadblocks for Implementing CMM 
There are particular roadblocks that Dutch 
energy market faces while working towards 
implementing the consent management 
mechanism for enabling access to the data 
for facilitating market and reaching the 
goals of “Clean Energy Package” as well 
as UN sustainable development goals: 
I. General legal ambiguity - the First 
roadblock for successful implementation of 
CMM is ambiguity related to data 
governance in the Dutch energy market. 
[31] Primary (e.g., Electricity Act) and 
secondary (e.g., Information Code) 
legislation in the Netherlands not only pre-
dates AVG but also scatters relevant 
provisions about processing of personal 
data, creating much ambiguity for the 
market parties about concretely what data 
constitutes personal data and what are 
their roles (who is a controller, processor). 
II. Data confidentiality and access -  
even if legislation is organized and clarified 
it is questionable under the current 
substantive norms whether provision of 
data by DSOs to third parties for additional 
services (See Table 3 – B2, B3) is even 
allowed due to the confidentiality 
requirements in Article 79 of the Electricity 
Act [25]. To elaborate on this issue, right to 
access (hereafter RtA) prescribed in Article 
15 of the AVG [32] does require DSOs to 
provide access to the consumers 
themselves, but not to ESs or ISPs. Such 
direct access (to ESs or ISPs) could be 
granted, for instance, if consumers 
exercised their right to data portability 
(rather than RtA) under Article 20 of AVG. 
[32] However, the Rt2DP can only be 
exercised if DSOs were processing the 
data on the grounds of the consent or 
performance of a contract. [33] While 
DSOs in all situations process data on the 
grounds of the statutory obligation (see 
Table 3)  they are not always involved in 
the processing as the data controller. In 
cases where data is being processed for 
billing purpose (see Table 3 – B1),   DSOs 
process personal data to support ESs that 
are supposedly data controllers, in this 
case, require data for the performance of 
the contract. Therefore it can be argued 
that in case of these data, the Rt2DP can 
apply to dissolve this roadblock. However, 
to say this with certainty, the first roadblock 
has to be dissolved, providing legal clarity 
on the roles of market parties with regards 
to the processing of personal data. Note 
that we refer to the confidentiality of the 
personal data regarding a consumer here. 
If DSOs are required to maintain the 
confidentiality of the data due to state or 
professional secrecy regulations, this 
cannot be overruled by Rt2DP nor by RtA. 
III. Authentication - one of the most 
discussed roadblocks to the successful 
implementation of CMM is the challenge of 
authenticating the consumer, giving the 
consent to the access/exchange of data. If 
not dealt properly, this might cause the 
data breach. [34] Any individual can 
contact an ISP, claiming to live at some 
address to then obtain meter readings of 
that household. In 2015, a journalist 
demonstrated that some ISPs in the 
Netherlands do not perform any identity 
check whatsoever. [35] Moreover, there 
has been data leaks where an ISP or ES 
accidentally or deliberately abused their 
access to data kept by EDSN. [36] 
Currently, to counter this issue, DSOs are 
conducting additional access control 
checks, requiring ESs or ISPs to supply 
some customer-specific information as 
proof that customers have permitted to 
access their data. [37] Note that as the 
roles of the parties are not clearly defined 
(See Roadblock I) and often change from 
one party to another, it is not easy to define 
the final responsible party for authorization 
(and therefore responsible for any possible 
data breach). As DSOs are the first node to 
the data collection, it is sometimes 
expected from them to take on this 
responsibility. However, in cases where 
processing is related to market facilitation 
(see Table 3 – B), such an assumption 
might be flawed. Regardless of the clarity 
on this issue, currently thought consent 
management mechanisms assume shared 
responsibility of the parties that are 
working together to agree on the sufficient 
mechanism for the authentication. While 
DigID [38] is a government solution for 
online authorization and cannot yet allow 
private companies such as parties at 
electricity market to use their services, 
similar mechanisms provided by private 
parties are being discussed. Currently 
discussed possible solutions include iDin 
[39] that is the authentication solution 
similar to the popular identification tool in 
the banking sector of the Netherlands 
(iDeal) and IRMA [40], a privacy-friendly 
solution designed by the researchers at 
Radboud University. Moreover, 
authentication can also be ensured and 
enhanced with other verification means. 
Identity of a consumer can be checked for 
instance, by sending a letter by mail with 
some access code required to get access 
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to consent management mechanism 
online. While this is a costly and slow 
process, smart meter infrastructure itself 
allows a cheap and effective way to 
authenticate customers: Meters display a 
message send by the DSO via P3 port. So 
to check the identity of a consumer (or the 
link of the identity to the specific address), 
the smart meter could display a message 
that the consumer reports back to the 
consent management mechanism. Note, 
that this functionality is used in other 
countries to authenticate consumers, but 
not (yet) in the Netherlands. [5] 
IV. Pressures – last but not the least 
significant roadblock to the proper 
implementation of the consent 
management mechanism are the 
pressures discussed in chapter 4. Fearful 
perception of the roll-out and the data 
exchange in public, might lead to posing 
excessive limitations on data processing 
within the Dutch energy market, hindering 
market parties to reap the full potential of 
smart metering, facilitate energy market by 
empowering the consumer and reach the 
goals of increased energy efficiency and 
renewable energy. 
8. Conclusions 
We have provided an overview of the 
situation in the Dutch energy market, in 
particular, elaborated the driving forces 
that are in place, pressuring market parties 
towards directions of increased privacy 
and at the same time more interoperability 
and open access to data. We highlighted 
roadblocks present while moving towards 
this direction and,  by doing so, we hope to 
provide absolute clarity on the steps 
necessary to implement system ensuring 
energy consumer is in control of her data. 
The first step towards this direction can be 
an update of the legislation and dissolving 
legal ambiguity. 
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